



A DCI Deliberation Guide

Climate Choices: The Responsibility to Pay

Who, if anyone, should be responsible for paying to implement the best climate strategies?

Format for Deliberation

Before the Deliberation

Read this document (Required)

The following short videos are optional but highly recommended:

- I. [Who should pay for climate change damage?](#) *BBC News* (4:48): High-level summary of loss and damage compensation discussions at Nov. 2022 UN climate meeting.
- II. [Should We Pay Climate Change Compensation?](#) *Good Morning Britain* (12:55): Energetic British morning show debate about whether the country should provide funds to other countries to help them adapt to climate change.
- III. [The Global Philosopher: Should the Rich World Pay for Climate Change?](#) *BBC News*: Wide-ranging discussion hosted by Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel with 60 people from 30 countries on who should pay for climate change (the whole episode is good, but the most relevant part is the first 12:56).

During the Deliberation

- I. Setting Expectations – 5 min.
- II. Getting to Know Each Other – 10 min.
- III. *The Nobody Pays Principle*: Should we only pursue strategies that do not require anyone to pay? – 10 min.
- IV. *The Polluter Pays Principle*: Should responsibility to pay be based on who has contributed the most to climate change? – 15 min.
- V. *The Beneficiary Pays Principle*: Should responsibility to pay be based on who benefits the most from climate change? – 15 min.
- VI. Break – 5 min.
- VII. *The Ability to Pay Principle*: Should responsibility to pay be based on who has the greatest capacity to do so? – 15 min.
- VIII. *The Equal Per Capita Share Principle*: Should responsibility to pay be equally shared by everyone? – 15 min.
- IX. Weighing the Options – 15 min.
- X. Reflections – 15 min.

Background

Citizens and policymakers can and should deliberate about which, if any, strategies should be utilized to respond to climate change. The DCI's first Climate Choices Deliberation Guide explored exactly this question and gave deliberators an opportunity to discuss the strengths and shortcomings of focusing on mitigation, adaptation, innovation, or sticking with the status quo.

This Deliberation Guide focuses us on **the question of who should pay for these strategies** once we have selected them. Most of the available strategies that are likely to have a significant effect on climate change will also be costly, and someone has to bear the burden of their expense. Switching to low carbon energy sources, planting trees to sequester carbon, building higher dikes to protect coastal areas, investing in new technologies – these actions will all be expensive, especially if they are implemented at a meaningful scale. Their costs will increase dramatically if they include the losses and damages from climate change that many countries already impacted by climate change are demanding that wealthy countries pay for.¹

The scale of these costs can be captured in several different ways. The McKinsey Global Institute, for example, has estimated that achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 so that global warming would be limited to 1.5°C would require **\$3.5 trillion more in annual spending on physical assets worldwide**. This is equivalent to half of global corporate profits and one-quarter of total tax revenue in 2020.² These added costs could therefore have a significant effect on employee wages, taxpayer bills, and/or consumer prices.

Another lens to consider these costs is carbon emissions. In order to limit warming to 1.5°C, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that “the remaining carbon budget from 2020 onwards for limiting warming to 1.5°C with a probability of 50% has been assessed as 500 GtCO₂.”³ Professor Piers Forster and his colleagues note that accomplishing this goal by 2050 would require global carbon emissions to fall by 1.4 GtCO₂ every year, which is **comparable to the 6% drop in emissions due to the global pandemic lockdowns in 2020**.⁴

We can also think about the costs of responding to climate change beyond carbon and cents, and consider **other types of expenses and investments** that will likely be needed. The time, for example, required to research, develop, advocate for, and implement the political strategies, economic tools, and technological solutions that will enable us to effectively respond to climate change is another type of cost. Such time commitments have large opportunity costs associated with them. Who will do this work?

¹ Bhandari, Preety, et al. [What Is "Loss and Damage" from Climate Change? 8 Key Questions, Answered](#). World Resources Institute. World Resources Institute. Dec. 2022.

² [The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bring](#). McKinsey & Company.

³ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III. [Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change](#). April 4, 2022; GtCO₂ is short for gigatons (or one billion tons) of carbon dioxide.

⁴ Foster, Piers, et al. [What the tiny remaining 1.5C carbon budget means for climate policy](#). CarbonBrief. Nov. 11, 2022; [After steep drop in early 2020, global carbon dioxide emissions have rebounded strongly](#), International Energy Agency, March 2021.

The Nobody Pays Principle

One option is to conclude these costs are too high and we should not bear any of them. Or we should **only pay for strategies that will generate an investment return or will have “co-benefits” that benefit humanity**, such as developing cheaper and better energy technologies, implementing smart city planning, and planting more trees in urban areas to reduce the heat island effect.⁵ Such co-benefits are “the positive effects that a policy or measure aimed at one objective might have on other objectives,” and can include “cleaner air, green job creation, public health benefits from active travel, and biodiversity improvement through expansion of green space.”⁶

There will likely be, however, costs associated with choosing only to implement policies that have such co-benefits or pay for themselves over time (such as investments in energy efficiency). To the extent that these limited strategies don’t effectively limit carbon emissions, the costs of climate change may also be quite high. The insurer Swiss Re, for example, has estimated that **climate inaction could decrease global GDP by as much as 14%**, or about \$23 trillion, by 2050. It concludes that significant productivity and income losses could stem from more frequent crop failures, severe weather disasters, and heat stress, for example.⁷ Deciding to not take any action (or only limited action) may therefore have significant costs as well.

If we decide to bear at least some of the costs of responding to climate change, the question of who should be responsible for paying them still remains. Outlined below are four possible answers to this question.

The Polluter Pays Principle

Environmental policy often follows the polluter pays principle, which asserts that those who created the problem should pay for solving it (“**you broke it, you fix it**”). This principle is embedded in many environmental laws, such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, also known as Superfund), which requires those responsible for the presence of a hazardous substance at a site to pay for its clean-up. This liability is **retroactive** – it applies to acts committed both before and after the passage of the law.⁸ This principle is rooted in concepts of **corrective justice**, which is focused on the “rectification of an injustice inflicted by one person on another.”⁹ Following this logic, polluters, such as emitters of greenhouse gases, have inflicted wrongful harm on others, and therefore must remedy the situation.

⁵ [Managing Climate Change: An Alternative Strategy](#). George W. Bush Institute.

⁶ Mayrhofer, Jan and Gupta Joyeeta. [The science and politics of co-benefits in climate policy](#). *Environmental Science & Policy*. 57: 22-30. March 2016; Simeran Bachra, [The Co-Benefits of Climate Action](#). Carbon Disclosure Project. 2020.

⁷ Mumenthaler, Christian. [The economic case for net zero is irresistible](#). Swiss Re. April 28, 2021.

⁸ [Superfund Liability](#). Environmental Protection Agency.

⁹ [Justice, Corrective](#). Ernest Weinrib. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

This conclusion raises many questions. **Who exactly are the polluters?** Are they nations? Corporations? Individuals? Larger scales of analysis risk erasing important distinctions at smaller scales (e.g., rich people in developing countries may be responsible for more carbon emissions than poor people in developed countries), and smaller scales of analysis may not take into account the effects of institutions that transcend the decisions of individuals (e.g., authoritarian regimes may have made decisions independent of its people that led to large carbon emissions).

Furthermore, should individuals or institutions be held responsible for wrongs that they were unaware they were committing? Peter Singer suggests that 1990 – the year the IPCC published its first report – is a useful date for determining when global awareness of climate change reached a tipping point.¹⁰ Before this point, we might ignore historical emissions, while after this point, we hold polluters accountable for their emissions. This solution, however, ignores **the problem of ignorance** at an individual level; people with less access to education and information may still be unaware of the dynamics of climate change today.

There is also **the problem of identifying actors and victims**. As Zakir Hossain points out, it is impossible to force members of previous generations to compensate victims of climate change they caused because they are already dead. Even if we accept a principle of cross-generational responsibility, it is difficult to identify whose ancestors are most responsible and whose descendents are the greatest victims (due to immigration, limited data, etc.). It is also difficult to assign causal relationships between emissions and specific instances of loss and damage. Climate change may have been a contributor to a particular flood, for example, but other factors may have been as or more important.¹¹ The problem of assigning responsibility also exists within supply chains; who is ultimately responsible for climate pollution – the producers of industrial and commercial goods, or the consumers of those goods?

Finally, what should be done about **polluters who are poor** and do not have the capacity to contribute to climate strategies? Simon Caney suggests that the Polluter Pays Principle should be qualified to prevent people being made to pay for emissions needed for their fundamental survival.¹² How one determines what level of poverty qualifies a person or a nation for this exemption then becomes the question (China and India are two relevant examples).

The Beneficiary Pays Principle

A different principle focuses not on who is responsible for the harm done, but who benefits from it. This “beneficiary pays” principle recognizes that people who might be contributing to the problem may not always be the ones who are benefiting from it. This principle can be justified on the grounds of either “**wrongful enrichment**,” in which an actor benefits from committing a wrong (e.g., violating another’s legitimate interests, performing an intrinsically

¹⁰ Singer, Peter. *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

¹¹ Hossain, Zakir. [Seeking Climate Justice: A Critical Response to Singer](#). Master’s Thesis, Linköping University, 2010.

¹² Caney, Simon. [Climate change and the duties of the advantaged](#). *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 13:1, 203-228, 2010.

wrong action), or “**unjust enrichment**,” in which an actor benefits from activities that result in unfair outcomes for other actors (even if they themselves didn’t do anything wrong). Given the challenges of establishing wrongdoing (similar to the polluter pays principle), David Page asserts that the unjust enrichment argument is stronger and that even when injustices occur without anyone doing anything wrong, the beneficiaries of this injustice still have a responsibility to rectify the situation.¹³

A further justification for using the beneficiary pays principle is that it more readily takes into account not only the benefits gained by the burning of fossil fuels but also from the **benefits of climate change itself**. The polluter pays principle would not require a beneficiary of a warming climate to compensate victims of climate change, but the beneficiary pays principle would.¹⁴

Some argue that these implications are the weaknesses of this approach, however. Robert Huseby objects to the use of the beneficiary pays principle because it leads to several **unintuitive conclusions**. It suggests, for example, that beneficiaries are only responsible for compensating victims if they are **part of the same causal chain**. If they are not, then the beneficiary has no such responsibility, even if the victim suffered the same impacts, albeit by a different causal chain. Huseby also claims that this principle may not properly rectify injustices, as beneficiaries are only responsible for compensating those who have suffered from actions that they have benefited from. Many harms may occur without anyone clearly benefitting from them. Both of these situations may leave many injured parties uncompensated.¹⁵

He also rejects a **generalized beneficiary pay principle** that requires us to prioritize helping those who have suffered unjust acts over those who have suffered freak accidents, which would disrespect the latter. Finally, he asserts that this principle will not hold up because some ways of benefiting from injustice do not require us to give up the received benefits. Actors are not obliged to give up benefits that they gained from the actions of others who they have no relationship with, for example.¹⁶

Other objections are similar to those lodged against the polluter pays principle.¹⁷ For example, Caney notes, for example, that “**most beneficiaries of historic emissions are now dead**, and it would be unfair to make those beneficiaries who happen to be alive foot the whole bill.”¹⁸ Clare Heyward responds that the beneficiary’s duty can be limited so that it does not exceed the received benefit and that even though some (the dead) might not pay, “this is not sufficient to

¹³ Page, David. [Give it up for climate change: a defence of the beneficiary pays principle](#). *International Theory*, 4(2), June 2012.

¹⁴ Heyward, Clare. [Is the beneficiary pays principle essential in climate justice?](#) *Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift* Vol.56, Iss.2-3: 125-136. Sept 2021.

¹⁵ Huseby, Robert. [Should the beneficiaries pay?](#) *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics*. 14(2): 209-225. May 2015.

¹⁶ Huseby, Robert. [Should the beneficiaries pay?](#) *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics*. 14(2): 209-225. May 2015.

¹⁷ Garcia-Portela, Laura. [Backward-Looking Principles of Climate Justice: The Unjustified Move from the Polluter Pays Principle to the Beneficiary Pays Principle](#). *Res Publica*. Nov. 2022.

¹⁸ Heyward, Clare. [Is the beneficiary pays principle essential in climate justice?](#) *Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift* Vol.56, Iss.2-3: 125-136. Sept 2021.

let the (live) beneficiaries off the hook.”¹⁹ If Bob and Jill owe a Anika money, Bob’s debt does not go away if Jill does not honor hers.

The Ability to Pay Principle

An alternative option is to rely on people’s ability to pay to right past wrongs. As Henry Shue has explained it, this ability to pay principle asserts that “among a number of parties, all of whom are bound to contribute to some endeavor; **the parties who have the most resources should contribute the most to the endeavor.**”²⁰ Thus nations that are high emitters but relatively poor have less of an obligation to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions than those who are low emitters but have the resources to make a difference.

This principle can be justified on several grounds. One justification is based on the difference principle articulated in John Rawl’s *Theory of Justice*: “all social primary goods, liberty and opportunity, income and wealth and the basis of self respect are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods are to **the advantage of the least favored.**”²¹ Cosmopolitan distributive justice suggests that wealthy nations should bear more of the costs of responding to climate change so that less well-off nations can reach their level of well-being. Hossain further argues that such a principle is justified because wealthier actors have an obligation – independent of their culpability or benefits – to ensure that the basic human rights of all people are protected, and increasingly climate change threatens those rights.²²

Caney maps out **four objections to the ability to pay principle**. The first is that it violates the polluter pays principle – why should someone pay for something that is not their fault? Caney responds that both the poor and advantaged might not be responsible; in this case, is it not more fair to make the advantaged pay instead of the poor? The second objection is the relevance of the past – this principle is entirely forward-looking, and thus does not take into account past actions. Why should we ignore the historical record? Caney accommodates this concern by suggesting that greater responsibility should lie with the wealthy whose wealth was acquired by endangering the climate.

The third objection focuses on the responsibilities of those who have gained their wealth in responsible ways without endangering the climate. Why should they have to pay anything? Caney responds that there are cases where a “person is obligated to assist others even when they played no part in the other’s poverty or sickness,” and this is one of them. The fourth objection asks why focus only on climate injustice, as some wealth may have been acquired through unjust ways independent of its climate impact. Caney suggests that they too bear greater responsibility to use their wealth to combat climate change.²³

¹⁹ Huseby, Robert. [Should the beneficiaries pay?](#) *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics*. 14(2): 209-225. May 2015.

²⁰ Shue, Henry. Global environment and international inequality. *International Affairs*. 75(3): 531-545, 1999.

²¹ Rawls 1971: 303 in Kymlicka 2002: 55 in Hossain 2010.

²² Hossain, Zakir. [Seeking Climate Justice: A Critical Response to Singer](#). Master’s Thesis, Linköping University, 2010.

²³ Caney, Simon. [Climate change and the duties of the advantaged](#). *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 13:1, 203-228, 2010.

The Equal Per Capita Share Principle

A final option to consider is to **allocate responsibility equally**, since, as Peter Singer summarizes, “Everyone has the same claim to part of the atmospheric sink as everyone else.”²⁴ This emissions egalitarianism posits that “everyone has an equal right to emit, and that everyone should thus have the same number of emissions permits,”²⁵ and has been defended on libertarian, utilitarian, and fairness grounds.

From a **libertarian perspective**, Ollie Torpman explains that the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases can be conceptualized as a “common global good that initially belongs to everyone” and that everyone owns an equal part of it.²⁶ From a **utilitarian perspective**, because of its relative simplicity, the equal per capita share principle represents a reasonable political compromise and is most likely to “push the political process forward towards a solution to the climate crisis,” which will have the best overall consequences. And from a **fairness perspective**, Torpman suggests that it is the most likely option to be chosen if you don’t know your present conditions (i.e., you are behind Rawls’ “veil of ignorance”).²⁷

Objections to this principle include a **concern about incentives** for nations to increase their populations so that they have greater emission allocations.²⁸ Responding to this concern, Singer suggests that national allocations be based on a country’s population in a particular year and not rise if population levels increased. To account for different national population structures, allocations could also be made “based on an estimate of a country’s likely population at some given future date.”²⁹

Another objection is that it **violates the polluter pays principle and a principle of helping those who are worst off**. As Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein state, “For those who seek redistribution to those who need help, on grounds of either welfare or fairness, per capita allocations of emissions rights are at best a mixed blessing.” Regarding the first concern, Torpman suggests that allocations can and should take into account past emissions and “people’s unequal historical usages of the atmospheric absorption capacity.”

This would result in poorer countries that have historically low emissions having more emission permits than those in countries with historically high emissions. This would benefit the worst off, although Torpman rejects the assumption that the allocation of “emissions permits is the most efficient means by which inequalities should be neutralized.” Even if one accepts the assumption that wealth redistribution is necessary, emission permit allocation may not be the best way to achieve it, particularly if insisting on it makes broad global agreement impossible.

²⁴ Singer, Peter. *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

²⁵ Torpman, Ollie. [The Case for Emissions Egalitarianism](#). *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*. 22: 749-762, 2019.

²⁶ Torpman, Ollie. [The Case for Emissions Egalitarianism](#). *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*. 22: 749-762, 2019.

²⁷ Torpman, Ollie. [The Case for Emissions Egalitarianism](#). *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*. 22: 749-762, 2019.

²⁸ Posner, Eric and Cass Sunstein. [Should Greenhouse Gas Permits be Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?](#) *California Law Review*, 51-94, 20, 2009.

²⁹ Singer, Peter. *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

As Singer concludes, the egalitarian principle may not be our first choice, but “when there is no other clear criterion for allocating shares...it can be an ideal compromise that leads to a peaceful solution, rather than to continued fighting.” This is the best defense, he argues, for defending “one person, one vote” as a rule of democracy against claims that the educated, the wealthy, the devout, or the worse off should count more because of their particular attributes.

Weighing the Options

In comparing these alternatives, a few points may be helpful. As Heyward points out, there are two dimensions of climate responsibility – the **responsibility to act** and **responsibility to bear the costs associated with any remedial action** – that can be separated and assigned differently. In this deliberation, we will focus on the cost-bearing responsibility, while our next deliberation will focus on the responsibility to take action.

We may find that none of the principles are wholly sufficient and want to find ways to combine, connect, or link them. To do so, it may be helpful to distinguish between two ways by which these principles can help assign responsibility. These functions include **identifying a “set of duty-bearers”** and **determining the extent of duties among that set**. One principle might serve the first function while another might serve the second function.

Principles may also serve as **necessary or sufficient conditions** for responsibility. For example, we might conclude that someone must be both a polluter and a beneficiary to have cost-bearing responsibility, or that one or the other is sufficient to assign this responsibility. A principle may also be used to **limit** the duties of some parties. Finally, we might identify one principle as the **primary principle**, but to the extent that it falls short in particular circumstances, a **secondary principle** may be invoked.

The table of empirical data below may help make these questions more tangible. It presents data on total annual emissions, per capita annual emissions, cumulative emissions since 1750, and the per capita consumption-based emissions of the four largest emitting nations (accounting for 59% of the world’s cumulative emissions). The consumption-based emissions have been adjusted for trade by subtracting emissions embedded in exports and adding emissions embedded in imports to a nation’s production-based emissions. As the table shows, China is the largest total emitter, while the US is the largest per capita and cumulative emitter.

	2021 Total Annual Emissions ¹	2021 Per Capita Annual Emissions ²	1750-2020 Cumulative Emissions ³	2020 Per Capita Consumption-Based Emissions ⁴
China	11.5 (31%)	8.1 (1.7x)	238.9 (14%)	7.0 (1.5x)
EU	2.8 (8%)	6.3 (1.3x)	290.4 (17%)	7.2 (1.6x)
India	2.7 (7%)	1.9 (.4x)	54.4 (3%)	1.6 (.4x)
US	5.0 (13%)	14.9 (3.2x)	416.9 (25%)	15.5 (3.4x)

¹ billion tons CO2 (% of global annual emissions); ² tons CO2 (multiple of global average of 4.69); ³ billion tons CO2 (% of global cumulative emissions); ⁴ tons CO2 (multiple of global average of 4.5). Red indicates the largest emitter in each category, followed by orange, green, and blue. [Our World in Data](#).

The discussion above is far from comprehensive, and the arguments and counter-arguments presented have been truncated for space reasons. The goal is to introduce us to some of the different principles and perspectives related to this complex set of questions. The table below summarizes some (but not all) of the most salient strengths and concerns connected to these principles discussed above.

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES AND RELATED STRENGTHS AND CONCERNS

The Nobody Pays Principle	
<i>Strengths</i>	<i>Concerns</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoids costs of responding to climate change • Avoids difficult decisions about who should pay 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fails to limit the impacts and future costs associated with climate change that could be mitigated by taking greater action now • Non-decision imposes costs on those most vulnerable to climate change
The Polluter Pays Principle	
<i>Strengths</i>	<i>Concerns</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Follows intuitive logic of “you broke it, you fix it” • Rectifies injustices imposed by polluters on others 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficulty of identifying polluters and victims • Imposes costs on people who did not know about the effects of climate change • Imposes costs on polluters who are currently poor
The Beneficiary Pays Principle	
<i>Strengths</i>	<i>Concerns</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Imposes costs on those who have benefitted from unjust or wrongful enrichment due to their contributions to climate change • Takes into account benefits accrued from both fossil fuels and climate change itself 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does not require beneficiaries to compensate victims not part of the same causal chain • Some beneficiaries cannot pay because they are dead; it is unfair to impose their duties on the living
The Ability to Pay Principle	
<i>Strengths</i>	<i>Concerns</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensures those with responsibility have the capacity to fulfill it • Protects the disadvantaged from burdensome climate responsibilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unfair to impose costs on people who did not contribute to the problem • Ignores current and historical contributions
The Per Capita Equal Share Principle	
<i>Strengths</i>	<i>Concerns</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allocates responsibility equally, recognizing everyone’s stake in the climate • Relative simplicity likely to generate a reasonable compromise among competing interests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May incentivize policies that increase national populations, exacerbating the climate problem • Violates the polluter pays principle and principle of helping those who are worst off

Setting Expectations (5 min)

In this section, we will review the “Expected Outcomes,” “Deliberative Dispositions,” and “Conversation Agreements” below.

Expected Outcomes of the Conversation

The purpose of this deliberation is to deepen our understanding of the arguments surrounding the allocation of responsibility for paying for climate strategies. Over the course of the deliberation, we will have the opportunity to listen to the perspectives of our fellow deliberators as well as share our own experiences and beliefs related to our climate responsibilities. By the end of the conversation, we will have deliberated about the strongest and weakest arguments for using the nobody pays principle, polluter pays principle, beneficiary pays principle, the ability to pay principle, and the equal per capita share principle. Finally, we will have reflected on our conversation, our areas of agreement and disagreement, and what we have learned from our time together.

Deliberative Dispositions

The DCI has identified several “deliberative dispositions” as critical to the success of deliberative enterprises. When participants adopt these dispositions, they are much more likely to feel their deliberations are meaningful, respectful, and productive. Several of the Conversation Agreements recommended below directly reflect and reinforce these dispositions, which include a *commitment to egalitarianism, openmindedness, empathy, charity, attentiveness, and anticipation*, among others. A full list and description of these dispositions is available at <https://deliberativecitizenship.org/deliberative-dispositions/>.

Conversation Agreements

In entering into this discussion, to the best of our ability, we each agree to:

1. Be authentic and respectful
2. Be an attentive and active listener
3. Be a purposeful and concise speaker
4. Approach fellow deliberators’ stories, experiences, and arguments with curiosity, not hostility
5. Assume the best - and not the worst - about the intentions and values of others, and avoid snap judgements
6. Demonstrate intellectual humility, recognizing that no one has all the answers, by asking questions and making space for others to do the same
7. Critique the idea we disagree with, not the person expressing it, and remember to practice empathy
8. Note areas of both agreement and disagreement
9. Respect the confidentiality of the discussion
10. Avoid speaking in absolutes (e.g., “All people think this,” or “No educated people hold that view”)

Getting to Know Each Other (10 min)

In this section, we will take less than a minute to share our names, where we are currently located, and answer one of the questions below.

- What are your hopes and concerns for your family, community and/or country?
- What would your best friend say about who you are?
- What sense of purpose / mission / duty guides you in your life?

The Nobody Pays Principle: Should we only pursue strategies that do not require anyone to pay? – 10 min.

In this section, we will examine the arguments for and against maintaining the “nobody pays principle” described in the text above. We will each take 1-2 minutes to answer each of the questions below, without interruption or crosstalk.

- *What are the **most important benefits and concerns** associated with this principle?*
- *Which of these arguments do you find **most persuasive**?*

After everyone has answered these questions, the group is welcome to take a few minutes for clarifying or follow up questions and responses as time allows.

Throughout our discussions, if there is strong disagreement in the group, we will try to explore the underlying reasons for the disagreement – are they based on different factual interpretations, different value emphases, or different life experiences? Perhaps we can agree on where precisely we disagree, which can be helpful. Alternatively, if there is widespread agreement in the group, try to dig deeper and examine the nuances of these policies – are there particular contexts, for example, where our agreement breaks down? Or perhaps our reasons for supporting particular policies are different? Exploring this complexity can be helpful as well.

The Polluter Pays Principle: Should responsibility to pay be based on who has contributed the most to climate change? – 15 min.

We will now discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the polluter pays principle. We will each address the question below, and then together we’ll explore our areas of agreement and disagreement. We can also generate additional ideas that may transcend and elicit more support than existing proposals.

- *What are the **most important benefits and concerns** associated with this principle?*
- *Which of these arguments do you find **most persuasive**?*

As time allows, we should engage with one another on our answers to these questions.

The Beneficiary Pays Principle: Should responsibility to pay be based on who benefits the most from climate change? – 15 min.

We will now evaluate arguments for and against the beneficiary pays principle. We will each address the questions below, and then together we'll explore our areas of agreement and disagreement.

- *What are the **most important benefits and concerns** associated with this principle?*
- *Which of these arguments do you find **most persuasive**?*

As time allows, we should engage with one another on our answers to these questions.

Brief Break (5 min)

Use this time as a chance to stretch your legs, go to the bathroom, get a drink of water, and re-charge for the next part of the deliberation.

The Ability to Pay Principle: Should responsibility to pay be based on who has the greatest capacity to do so? – 15 min.

We will now discuss the pros and cons of the ability to pay principle. We will each address the question below, and then together we'll explore our areas of agreement and disagreement.

- *What are the **most important benefits and concerns** associated with this principle?*
- *Which of these arguments do you find **most persuasive**?*

As time allows, we should engage with one another on our answers to these questions.

The Equal Per Capita Share Principle: Should responsibility to pay be equally shared by everyone? – 15 min.

We will now evaluate the equal per capita share principle. We will each address the question below, and then together we'll explore our areas of agreement and disagreement.

- *What are the **most important benefits and concerns** associated with this principle?*
- *Which of these arguments do you find **most persuasive**?*

As time allows, we should engage with one another on our answers to these questions.

Weighing the Options (15 min)

This is a time to discuss the relative importance of the five options we have discussed so far – the nobody pays principle, polluter pays principle, beneficiary pays principle, ability to pay principle, and equal per capita share principle.

- After considering the specifics of each option, which of these five options should we prioritize?
- Are there ways you would prefer to combine or link these principles?
- Are there other options we haven't considered yet?
- How should the responsibility to pay for the estimated \$3.5 trillion annually required to mitigate climate change be allocated?

We can frame our discussion around these questions, and together we can explore our areas of agreement and disagreement.

Reflections (15 min)

While today's conversation is an important step in the journey, effectively managing the tradeoffs associated with how we allocate our climate responsibilities will take time and commitment. Please reflect on the insights from your discussion with your fellow participants today, and then answer one of the questions below without interruption or crosstalk. After everyone has answered, the group is welcome to continue exploring additional questions as time allows.

1. What was most meaningful or valuable to you during this deliberation?
2. Where are the areas of both agreement and disagreement in your group?
3. Have any new ways to think about this issue occurred to you as we have talked today? Any new ideas that might transcend our current way of conceiving of the problem and its potential solutions?
4. Was there anything that was said or not said that you think should be addressed with the group? Are there any perspectives missing from this conversation that you feel would be important to hear?
5. What did you hear that gives you hope for the future of conversations on issues related to climate change?
6. Is there a next step you would like to take based upon the deliberation you just had?

About This Guide

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The Deliberative Citizenship Initiative

The Deliberative Citizenship Initiative (DCI) is dedicated to the creation of opportunities for Davidson students, faculty, staff, alumni, and members of the wider community to productively engage with one another on difficult and contentious issues facing our community and society. The DCI regularly hosts facilitated deliberations on a wide range of topics and organizes training workshops for deliberation facilitators. To learn more about these opportunities, visit www.deliberativecitizenship.org.

DCI Deliberation Guides

The DCI has launched this series of Deliberation Guides as a foundation for such conversations. They provide both important background information on the topics in question and a specific framework for engaging with these topics. The Guides are designed to be informative without being overwhelming and structured without being inflexible. They cover a range of topics and come in a variety of formats but share several common elements, including opportunities to commit to a shared set of Conversation Agreements, learn about diverse perspectives, and reflect together on the conversation and its yield. The DCI encourages conversations based on these guides to be moderated by a trained facilitator. After each conversation, the DCI also suggests that its associated Pathways Guide be distributed to the conversation's participants.

DCI Pathways Guides

For every Deliberation Guide, the DCI has also developed an associated Pathways Guide, which outlines opportunities for action that participants can consider that are related to the covered topic. These Pathways Guides reinforce the DCI's commitment to an action orientation, a key deliberative disposition. While dialogue and deliberation are themselves important contributors to a healthy democracy, they become even more valuable when they lead to individual or collective action on the key issues facing society. Such action can come in a range of forms and should be broadly understood. It might involve developing a better understanding of a topic, connecting with relevant local or national organizations, generating new approaches to an issue, or deciding to support a particular policy.

If you make use of this guide in a deliberation, please provide attribution to the Deliberative Citizenship Initiative and email dc@deliberativecitizenship.org to tell us about your event. To access more of our growing library of Deliberation Guides, Pathways Guides and other resources, visit www.deliberativecitizenship.org/readings-and-resources.